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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Bitter fruit 
President Putin is a man missing a sense of history, and this flaw is blinding as 
he responds to the Beslan tragedy. Putin also seems to suffer from a lack of 
basic human compassion, so aptly demonstrated by his immediate predecessor, 
but perhaps he just suffers by comparison. His political response to Beslan — the 
proposals to do away with single-candidate mandates, the de facto appointment 
of regional governors, the creation of a special commission on the Caucasus 
(with a somewhat confusing mandate) — all seem tossed like darts, wildly off the 
mark. Perhaps Putin’s post-Beslan prescriptions finally provide more insight into 
the weaknesses of his regime, rather than its strengths. 
 
The internal political changes, as has been noted so aptly by many analysts, 
appear unlikely to have any impact on the ability of terrorists to strike within 
Russia. The emasculation of the Duma, including the removal of legislative 
initiative, simply weakens further political opposition to the regime, but cannot 
possibly be viewed as an effective tool in the struggle against terrorism. The 
Potemkin public oversight provided by the Public Chamber is farcical; the idea 
that the Duma is allowed only to vote up or down on bills spawned in the 
Chamber effectively destroys the separation of powers between the executive 
and legislative branches. 
 
The de facto appointment of regional leaders presents another challenge to the 
definition of democracy in Russia. Apart from undermining the practice of 
federalism (it is, after all, the Russian Federation), this move to reinvigorate the 
"vertical of power" also seems misdirected. What does Putin, or the country, 
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stand to gain from the removal of local choice in local leadership and the 
imposition of centrally cast figures in local roles? While there is some speculation 
that Putin fears the "Gorbachev" variant, where regional leaders simply ignore 
Central commands, it seems more plausible that this President doesn’t so much 
fear regional autonomy as he seeks a sense of control, expressed by the 
appointment of either trusted associates or loyal underlings. (1) He has many 
levers at his disposal to rein in local action, but he has chosen the move that not 
only subordinates the regional head directly to the Kremlin, but also keeps strict 
control over the upper house of parliament, and, oddly, forces his own personal 
identification with regional problems. If there is no heat in Karelia this winter, 
Putin will have no way to deflect the blame away from, the Kremlin initially, but 
eventually himself. 
 
Putin’s decision to send Dmitri Kozak to the Caucasus is the most typical Kremlin 
response to problem-areas. If an area (be it of policy or territory) needs particular 
attention, unleash the reformer du jour on the situation. While it does seem 
comforting that it is Kozak and not, say, Viktor Ivanov, who is slated to oversee 
reforms in the Caucasus, it also resembles familiar chatter. As with the creation 
of the Public Chamber, it is hard to maintain high expectations of meaningful 
action when presented with the gauzy appearance of reform rather than a 
realistic plan to find solutions. 
 
The most disconcerting aspect of Putin’s pronouncements to date is the quickly 
drawn conclusion that they are unlikely to accomplish anything positive for the 
Russian population in the wake of Beslan. They may make it easier for Putin to 
set the legislative agenda, to quell opposition to any presidential measures, to 
sidestep regional demands, to stamp out grass roots brush fires, and to continue 
the Putin presidency ad nauseum, but actually make citizens safer, or protect the 
regime from criticism in the unfortunate likelihood of further terrorist attacks? Not 
this plan. 
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Two conclusions arise: First, perhaps Putin believes he has nothing to fear from 
more attacks or popular unrest. Ruling with the siloviki around him, Putin may 
well believe that it is centralized control and in particular, control of the populace, 
that will stabilize Russia. Being particularly familiar with the workings of the police 
state, Putin may see it as the easiest model for Russia right now. He certainly is 
not concerned with the development of democracy. If it is to be a police state, he 
needs to make sure the security services are happy in their position, and 
prepared for their role in society. Beslan could not possibly have brought a sense 
of pride to the bandana-clad, semi-trained, poorly equipped, unprepared security 
forces. If this is the pillar of the state on which Putin hopes to rest his regime, he 
needs to take far greater care of the security services than has been evident thus 
far. 
 
The other possibility is that Putin responded to Beslan in the only way he knew: 
according to a plan that drew power closer to the Kremlin without thinking 
through the ramifications in these circumstances. Putin is, after all, only pursuing 
a leadership path carved out during the Yel’tsin years. How many of those 
analyzing the Kremlin-drafted 1993 Constitution saw the potential development of 
a dictatorial executive? The broad strokes of powers granted to the President 
seemed, even then, to carry the caveat that while Yel’tsin might never exercise 
the range of authority allowable under the Constitution, changes would have to 
be made before someone came along who would push that particular envelope. 
The questionable ratification of the document in the December 1993 elections 
(and the regime’s subsequent insistence on a "Social Accord" in May 1994 to 
recognize the Constitution) seemed to highlight the temporary and personality-
based nature of the Constitution (and the Yel’tsin years in general). 
 
Putin is, in fact, hampered by the legacy of the leader who brought him to power. 
Yel’tsin’s resignation in December 1999 and the appointment of Putin as his 
successor presented the current President with a double-edged sword. Putin’s 
choice, on the evening of his accession, to fly to Chechnya and personally hand 
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out daggers to the troops speaks volumes. He assumed the mantle of the 
presidency, complete with the atrocities of Chechnya, as well as a system, 
heavily reliant on a "democracy for bureaucracy" happy civil service designed by 
Yel’tsin, to reward personal loyalty over state service and institutional 
development. 
 
With a constitution malleable enough to form a strongly authoritarian, executive-
driven regime, Putin was well situated to produce the kind of political system in 
Russia that would accomplish his goals. The alarm flags raised by analysts 
concerned about the encroachment of power organ officers in the halls of the 
Kremlin reflected their familiarity with the temptations of power without limits. One 
legacy Yel’tsin was not able to pass along to Putin was his ability to balance 
interests in his inner circle and keep individuals representing a variety of sectors 
of life around him. While one or two holdovers of the Yel’tsin Family may still 
occupy Kremlin space, the importance of the group is gone, leaving Putin alone 
with his siloviki clan. 
 
Putin, in his conversation with western journalists and analysts following the 
Beslan siege, acknowledged that mistakes had been made in dealing with 
Chechnya, both by his administration and his predecessor’s. He asked for 
positive recommendations on how to move beyond the past (a difficult task in any 
environment). Herewith, a modest suggestion for President Putin on an 
appropriate response to Beslan, one that, one hopes would make Russia more 
secure: 
 
Putin has identified the southern regions (the North Caucasus) as the most 
pressing immediate problem: "in the south, where we face real danger, we have 
no borders at all." (2) There has also been tough rhetoric and pressure on the 
southern states of the former Soviet Union to cooperate with Russian "anti-
terrorist" missions. Here, Putin must also wrestle with the Yel’tsin legacy, as must 
the southern states of the "near abroad." 
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Separatist movements, one of which has proven so devastating to Russia, have 
also plagued the Newly Independent States. Georgia, in particular, has been rent 
by separatist strife for a decade. If Russia wishes its neighbors' assistance, it is 
time for Putin, if not to acknowledge the role Russia played in destabilizing those 
neighbors, at least to renounce any territorial claims and create a firewall 
between indigenous separatists and Russian security 
services/military/governmental or monetary succor. Before Russia can 
reasonably expect a positive Georgian response to its requests with help in 
staunching the flow of Chechen refuges and, potentially, fighters, Russia must 
denounce the type of separatism that plagues the region, within and beyond 
Russia. 
 
Putin, if he is to be an effectively strong leader, must set aside the prideful 
chauvinism of Soviet revanchism and make clear his intention to sever ties with 
those who would destabilize other sovereign states. After all, Georgia, must 
simply be expected to forget the Russian pilots flying for the "Abkhaz Air Force" 
or the sudden appearance of an Abkhaz Navy? A reasonable approach to 
securing Russia’s southern borders is to cooperate with neighboring regimes, 
and cooperation entails trust. Unfortunately, trust is a legacy squandered by 
previous regimes and unattended by the current Russian president. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, "Fortress on Sand," Interview with Lilia Shevtsova, 27 
Sep 04 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), #8383, 28 Sep 04. 
(2) President Putin’s Remarks at an Enlarged Government Session, 13 Sep 04 
via (www.kremlin.ru). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
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By Eric Beene 
 
Beslan certainly will prove a watershed event in Russia on many levels and in 
many areas, not least for the security services. A few additional details have 
emerged in the weeks since the event, although official investigations are not yet 
complete. In a closed session discussion at the Federation Council, Federal 
Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev claimed that security services 
had not planned to storm Beslan Middle School Number 1, overtaken by 30 or 
more hostage-takers holding over 1,000 hostages. "We simply weren't ready at 
that moment [that the firefight began, the morning of 3 September]." Patrushev 
also indicated that authorities on the scene did not intend to deceive the media 
and locals about the numbers of hostages and hostage-takers in the school, "but 
merely were reluctant to disseminate unconfirmed information for fear of 
escalating tensions in the region, especially between Ingush and Ossetians." (1) 
 
The final casualty tally of the special forces is 11 dead (10 on the scene and one 
later in hospital) and 30 injured (Alfa and Vympel units, including the Alfa group 
commander). (2) The relatively high number of casualties indicates the lack of 
preparation may have been systemic, not just incidental for this event. Russian 
media showed footage of special forces members without their body armor 
during the siege as an indication that there was no plan to storm the building, but 
the evidence also seems to indicate there was no discipline or strong command 
and control among the troops. (3) 
 
In a separate event, an FSB warrant officer in the border guards, recently 
resubordinated to the FSB, was arrested on suspicion of helping criminals flee 
the country. It’s unclear how many he helped, but the sting operation that led to 
the arrest also found blank passports, blank air tickets, and forged stamps. (4) 
These events, along with other such examples, reveal a level of corrosion even 
within the special services. This is the same corruption and lack of discipline to 
which President Putin referred in his comments immediately following the siege, 
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and indicates that corruption and low morale has invaded even the most elite of 
Russia’s security services; the systemic nature of this breakdown that 
presumably enabled the siege to take place in the first place, and indicates that 
Russian government, at some levels, acknowledges its existence and detrimental 
impact on providing the very security Putin seeks. 
 
Several actions have been proposed to help reverse this condition. In the 
immediate wake of the Beslan siege, Presidential Aide Aslambek Aslakhanov 
announced "measures to raise the efficiency of special services and law 
enforcement agencies. This will affect equipment, material and technical 
supplies, and welfare guarantees. Special services must have more financial 
resources for effective and quick work. There will be structural changes as well." 
(5) It is not clear what the specific structural changes will be, especially in light of 
the FSB restructuring plan undertaken last summer. Those changes included 
elevating the FSB to the status of a ministry, a recombination of departments to 
reduce the number of deputy chairmen from twelve to four, but to reward the 
remaining four with deputy minister titles and with corresponding increased 
salaries and benefits. The July announcement also indicated FSB Director 
Patrushev has three months to "come up with suggestions regarding the 
coordination of all existing legislative instruments pertaining to the FSB." That 
deadline would have been October, but events in Beslan may supersede such 
guidance. It is suggested, however, that real change will not be forthcoming until 
wages are raised and professionalism is encouraged and enhanced throughout 
all levels of the FSB. (6) 
 
To that end, recently announced budget changes may suggest hope for reform. 
According to Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, the 2005 budget will see a total 
increase of 157 billion rubles ($5.4B) for security services, with 50 billion rubles 
earmarked specifically for the FSB and border guards to procure hardware and 
training. There will also be an undefined increase in the 2004 budget. (7) Of 
course, the budgets for these ministries have increased manifold under the Putin 
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administration already; and yet corruption pervades and, as was seen in Beslan, 
preparation for and prevention of terrorist attacks remains woefully inadequate. 
(8) 
 
It also remains to be seen how training will change in the future following Beslan 
and the resulting reforms. During South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s visit 
to Kazakhstan and Russia, a Korean Special Warfare Command (KSWC) 
spokesman revealed that Russia’s Alfa unit conducted joint anti-terror training 
exercises in Korea in June of this year with the KSWC, the third in a series of 
such events since 2002. (9) Although Alfa thus has had the opportunity to share 
lessons learned and to attempt to learn from outsiders, these exercises proved of 
little value in real situations like Beslan. 
 
Larger training budgets may allow for more exercises within Russia and 
cooperative efforts with a wider group of foreign forces, but western countries 
may take issue with the unit’s heritage and conduct. It must be remembered that 
Alpha was founded 30 years ago as Group A in the 7th Directorate of the KGB 
and tasked with counter-terrorism, international and internal. (10) Having a 
professional military counter-terror unit help train a former KGB unit may put off 
western officers. Recent FSB actions further complicate cooperation: Three 
weeks after the end of the Beslan siege, FSB agents discovered an explosives-
laden car in Moscow destined for Kutuzovskii Prospekt, along President Putin’s 
motorcade route. The next day, the driver of the car, 38-year old Alexander 
Pumane, who was reportedly paid $1,000 to deliver the car from St. Petersburg, 
died "in the emergency room, reportedly suffering from a massive brain 
hemorrhage, skull fractures, and injuries to his back, stomach, and hips" after 
three hours of questioning by FSB agents. (11) The fact that the FSB prevented 
the detonation of the car bomb is encouraging; its interrogation methods — less 
so. 
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The announced budget supplements appear to be aimed at forces on the front-
lines of terrorism, and the modifications to the "vertical of power" appear to target 
the highest levels of government; a glaring gap appears however, between these 
levels and command and control. Georgi Satarov, an advisor during the Yel’tsin 
administration, claims that during the Beslan siege the Kremlin failed to 
communicate guidance and direction to the forces on the ground. Even when the 
hostage-takers appeared to want to negotiate, phone service had been 
disrupted, prohibiting negotiations. Aslakhanov himself claims he wanted to go to 
Beslan sooner, but unnamed officials in Moscow prevented it. (12) Clearly, there 
is pressure to respond and reform after the Beslan siege, especially given its 
similarities to previous attacks; the security services have unique lessons to learn 
from this event as well. It remains to be seen if they will. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline Vol. 8, No. 180, Part I, 
21 Sep 04. 
(2) "Russia: Eleven Special Forces Servicemen Killed in Beslan Tragedy," 
Interfax, Tuesday, 7 Sep 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0907 via World News Connection. 
(3) "Trading Blood for Money," by Pavel Felgenhauer, The Moscow Times, 21 
Sep 04. Page 13. 
(4) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline, Vol. 8, No. 179, Part I, 
20 Sep 04. 
(5) "Russia: Kremlin Aide Says Russia Has Immediate Plan to Reform Security 
Services," Interfax, 8 Sep 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0908 via World News Connection. 
(6) "Reform of Russia's Federal Security Service, Emergencies Ministry 
Detailed," Vremya Novostey, 15 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0715 via World News 
Connection. 
(7) "Russia Making Choice," WPS Observer Report; What the Papers Say, 17 
Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(8) "Russian security budget expands during Putin's watch," AFP, 19 Sep 04 via 
Johnson’s Russia List, #8374. 
(9) "President Embarks on Five-day Visit to Moscow, Astana on N.K., Economy" 
by Hwang Doo-hyong, Yonhap, 19 Sep 04; online at http://english.yna.co.kr/ 
Engnews/20040919/300200000020040919175521E7.html and "S. Korean, 
Russian Counter terror Forces Conduct Joint Exercise," Yonhap, 20 Sep 04; 
FBIS-EAS-2004-0920 via World News Connection. 
(10) "Russian crack antiterrorist unit marks its 30th anniversary" presented on 
Russian NTV, 29 Jul 04, translated by BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(11) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline, Vol. 8, No. 179, Part I, 
20 Sep 04. 
(12) "Critics Detail Missteps in School Crisis" by Kim Murphy, Los Angeles 
Times, 17 Sep 04, via Johnson’s Russia List, #8372. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Responses to Beslan 
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in his 4 September address, following 
the attacks in Beslan, that "terrorists meet the most effective resistance in places 
where they not only encounter the state’s power but also find themselves facing 
an organized and united civil society." (1) As the Kremlin takes action to solidify 
its "power vertical" in the face of terrorism, international responses to these 
actions, and to Putin’s admonitions, have surfaced with varying degrees of 
support. 
 
In response to the assertion by "Russia’s most wanted," Shamil Basaev, of 
responsibility for the Beslan hostage taking and the airplane explosions (2), U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated that "Anyone who would use 
innocents for political aims is not worthy of existence." (3) The vehemence of this 
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condemnation reflects U.S. continued consciousness of the events of September 
11. Thus, there is a degree of U.S. support for Putin’s "war on terror" but with 
reservations. After a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in New 
York on 23 September, during the 59th U.N. General Assembly, Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that "our proposals have met with quite a 
positive response on the part of our U.S. colleagues and other permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council." (4) However, this follows negative 
comments from Powell, on 15 September, regarding some of Putin’s "power 
vertical" steps: "It would not be the best course of action to move in a direction 
which would be seen by the international community as moving toward the rear 
with respect to democratic reforms." (5) Lavrov responded that Washington had 
no right to impose its model of democracy on others, but EU External Relations 
Commissioner Chris Patten backed Powell’s remarks. (6) Russia responded with 
criticism of Western Asylum policies. During his address to the U.N., Lavrov 
called on the U.S. and the U.K. to "end the practice of extending political asylum 
to terrorists and their accomplices and sponsors." (7) This statement referred, of 
course, to the Chechens, Ilyas Akhmadov and Akhmed Zakaev, in the U.S. and 
U.K., respectively. Putin also criticized the U.S. and Britain for allegedly not 
counteracting drug trafficking from Afghanistan. In a recent meeting with Viktor 
Cherkesov of the Drug Enforcement Committee, Putin scolded the West for 
concealing from the general public the level of this threat. (8) 
 
It seems that Georgia has the most to fear as Russia prepares to take 
preemptive strikes against any perceived terrorist threat. There have been 
attempts to connect the events in Beslan to South Ossetia, implying that there 
are Chechen villages in the Pankisi Gorge, which are "safe havens" for terrorists. 
This is just one more development in a long-standing bilateral dispute that has 
had Georgia on the defense for some time. Lavrov met with his Georgian 
counterpart, Ms. Salome Zurabishvili on 21 September and expressed that 
Russia desires friendly relations with Georgia. However, it is clear that the 
Kremlin wants a "friendship" on its own terms. Russian Foreign Ministry 
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spokesman Alexander Yakovenko: "We would like to see the reciprocal taking 
into consideration of our lawful interests, specifically…upholding Russia’s 
security, including the war on terrorism." (9) The situation continues to darken, as 
a Russian website (utro.ru) reported on 23 September that Basaev has left 
Russia for the Pankisi Gorge; the same website also quoted an unidentified 
source as saying that, in August, Basaev met with Georgian Interior Minister 
Irakli Okruashvili and that both men saw Russia as the enemy. (10) This news, 
as well as Moscow’s declaration that, as of 1 October, no Georgian aircraft would 
be allowed to land in Russia (Georgian airlines have been accused of not paying 
airport dues), does not bode well for Georgia. (11) 
 
President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov of Kalmykia has encountered opposition 
demonstrations in Elista, after being reelected easily for the third time. His 
seemingly friendly relations with Chechen separatists regarding apportionment of 
lands for "Chechen villages" have brought, thus far, little condemnation from the 
Kremlin. (12) Press Secretary Fedor Shcherbakov of the presidential regional 
representation in the South Federal District said in response to the 
demonstrations: "Kirsan Ilyumzhinov is a legitimate president and questions 
about his dismissal should be solved only by political means. All attempts to 
solve this question by means of force will be suppressed." (13) Dmitri Kozak, the 
Presidential Envoy in the South Federal District, will go to Moscow to discuss the 
situation. 
 
One of the most interesting reactions to Putin’s latest initiatives has come from 
former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. He stated that, unlike Putin, he believes 
the recent terrorism is linked directly to the military operations in the Caucasus 
and that he understood the consequences, back in 1994, of the first Chechen 
war. In a recent interview, he commented critically, "How can we possibly 
eliminate corruption without a normal parliament, a free press or without public 
oversight? Yet, there is in fact no progress…Exactly the opposite is happening…. 
Under the banner of fighting terrorism, it is planned to limit sharply democratic 
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freedoms and deprive the citizens of the right to directly express their attitude 
toward the ruling authority — in free elections." (14) Gorbachev advocates 
"stamping out terrorism through political means, not by the use of force." (15) 
Gorbachev once initiated a campaign for "glasnost'," but Putin seems to be 
leading his country away from such "openness" in the name of security. 
 
The Tehran Connection 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.’s atomic watchdog, 
has called on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment activities; Moscow also 
supports this call. It is helping Tehran build a nuclear reactor at the port of 
Bushehr despite pressure from the U.S., which is concerned that Tehran is 
seeking atomic weapons. Putin has delayed action to open the plant until the 
IAEA declares Iran clean. (16) Moscow's position on Iran's nuclear future will 
most likely be guided by IAEA findings and will further be formulated during the 
25 November board of governors session. (17) 
 
The Strategic East and the SOC 
Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov, described the 24 September talks with 
Chinese Premier Wen Jibao as "very fruitful." China is willing to invest sizeable 
sums in gas extraction projects in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. This 
year’s total Russian-Chinese trade turnover is expected to hit $20 billion. A joint 
statement was signed saying that amount will meet, and possibly exceed, $60 
billion by 2010. China is interested in securing a closer partnership with Russia 
on a variety of issues, including bio-engineering, space efforts, the nuclear power 
industry and other R&D fields. (18) The construction of an oil pipeline from 
Russia to China remains on the agenda. (19) As Russia's strategic partner, 
China also supports Russia’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
It is expected that a protocol on Russian accession to the WTO will be signed 
when Putin visits China in October. The Russian government expects to 
complete all WTO talks before the end of the year and to join in 2005-2007. (20) 
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SOC) met in Bishkek on 23 September 
with much discussion of the establishment of a free trade zone and common 
market. China urged Central Asia and Russia to form a common market but 
Moscow fears China’s economic dominance in post-Soviet territory. In spite of 
the growing Sino-Russian partnership, a Russian official stated, "We turned the 
idea down, knowing all too well that China was after expansion into our markets." 
(21) Fradkov said that SOC concentration should be on pilot projects, such as tax 
legislation unification. However, Prime Minister Danial Akhmatov of Kazakhstan 
urged for a movement of goods, capitals and services among the SOC, and 
Uzbek Deputy Premier Utir Sultanov backed Beijing’s call for a common market, 
saying that the establishment of a free trade zone should be a priority. 
Interestingly enough, in spite of the recent terrorism in Russia, the Bishkek 
meeting only mentioned problems with terrorism in passing. (22) Their Regional 
Counter-Terrorism Center was established in 2003. The SOC is comprised of 
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Kremlin.ru, 4 Sep 04 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL). 
(2) Moscow News, 22 Sep 04; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging 
Markets. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 24 Sep 04, Vol.8, No. 183. 
(5) BBC News, 15 Sep 04; 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 24 Sep 04, Vol.8, No.183. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Itar-Tass, 22 Sep 04 via www.itar-tass.com News ID 12717080. 
(10) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 24 Sep 04, Vol.8, No. 183. 
(11) BBC News, 14 Sep 04; news.bbc.co.uk 
(12) Moskovskii komsomolets, 24 Sep 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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(13) Ibid. 
(14) Moscow News, 22 Sep 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(15) Ibid. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) RIA Novosti, 23 Sep 04. 
(18) RIA Novosti, 24 Sep 04. 
(19) Ibid. 
(20) Prime-TASS, 24 Sep 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(21) Izvestia, 23 Sep 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(22) Vedomosti, 24 Sep 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
In the aftermath of Beslan 
The terrorist attacks in Beslan have provided a catalyst for certain changes in 
Russia, not the least of which concern President Vladimir Putin’s newly proposed 
attempts to strengthen "the vertical of power," introducing a new — or possibly a 
rather old — dimension to Russian politics. If passed, these changes will 
consolidate Putin’s control of the legislative and executive branches as well as 
the Kremlin-sponsored United Russia party. 
 
The three primary aspects of these proposals are: First, governors will no longer 
be directly elected by the population of their regions. Instead, their candidatures 
will be recommended by the president and confirmed by the territorial 
legislatures. (1) Consequently, the Federation Council will be emasculated even 
more than now. The second element concerns the lower house. Putin 
recommends electing all Duma members from proportional election lists, 
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effectively eliminating single-member districts and independent candidates. (2) 
Moreover, the Duma will lose legislative initiative. The third element is the 
creation of a Public Chamber. "….This chamber should become a place for 
conducting public examinations of key state decisions….This essentially means 
civilian control of the work of the state system, including the law-enforcement 
bodies and the special services…," said Putin in his address concerning the new 
institution. (3) "Civilian control" is rather limited, given the advisory role of the 
chamber. Should the public voice its concerns using the forum of the Public 
Chamber without there being an impact on government decisions, that body 
would lose any representational pretense. 
 
Putin claims that the changes will increase the ability of the government to 
respond quickly to terrorist situations. Several Russian analysts have contested 
this claim, however. Mark Urnov, of the Ekspertiza Analytical Programs 
Foundation, commented that "…this will intensify inefficiency, it will intensify 
delay, it will intensify bureaucratization, and it will intensify the corruption within 
the state power." (4) Stanislav Belkovsky, a member of the Institute of National 
Strategy, criticized the reform because of its potential impact on established 
elites. "…What is happening now will lead to utter chaos this year — because the 
elite that is being removed from power will do everything possible to sabotage 
the process and also to plunder everything that has not been plundered already." 
(5) 
 
Even a Duma Deputy Speaker, Oleg Morozov, admits that the connection 
between the proposed changes and terrorism is weak. "Of course, there is no 
absolutely direct connection between the fight against terrorism and appointment 
of governors," he said. (6) Morozov went on to resist any comparison of Putin’s 
actions with Russia’s Communist history. "…I do not see any parallels with the 
Soviet Union or the one-party system….inside a political system called 
democratic there are certain options for movement in one or other direction [sic] 
while still preserving rules of a democratic society….You can even find some 
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unique examples elsewhere in the world: the Chinese political and economic 
systems. In that country, a huge amount of economic freedoms exist against the 
backdrop of a rigid, authoritarian, and, if you will, totalitarian political system." (7) 
Comparing the Russian government with the world’s largest remaining 
Communist country can hardly be considered an effective argument in favor of 
the changes. 
 
Putin’s announcement of the proposed nomination of governors has already had 
a major effect. Ten governors have joined the United Russia party since Putin’s 
announcement, with another twenty waiting in line, according to party leader 
Boris Gryzlov. "I see this as a growth of trust in our party," said Gryzlov. (8) Trust 
in the party aside, United Russia is the party favored by the Kremlin. The exodus 
of so many regional leaders — around half of Russia’s 89 governors are now 
members of United Russia (9) — indicates a clear bid on the part of governors to 
retain office. 
 
Putin defended the elimination of single-member constitutions in a speech at the 
World Congress of News Agencies. "I want to note that the majority system in 
many countries of the world is regarded as archaic, and many countries are 
gradually giving it up because a person elected by a one-seat constituency to a 
country’s supreme representative body of power can promise much of everything 
in the course of campaigning, but he or she is absolutely incapable of bringing at 
least one of his ideas to fruition or of keeping any one of his promises. Such a 
person has to form links to a major party." (10) 
 
The Federation Council agreed on important elements of a draft resolution on 
counter-terrorism to be voted on September 29. (11) The Federation Council was 
also expected to make an announcement concerning the legislative investigation 
into Beslan. Sergei Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council, said that the 
investigation commission would be made up of eleven members of the 
Federation Council and ten State Duma deputies. (12) 
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North Ossetia seethes 
North Ossetia has experienced its share of political upheaval following the 
hostage situation. On September 8, 3,000 irate North Ossetians rallied outside 
the headquarters of Aleksander Dzasokhov, North Ossetia's President, seeking 
his resignation. (13) Dzasokhov responded to the pressure by announcing that 
he was dismissing all of his ministers. Dzasokhov began replacing the ministers 
(14) even as the Russian Prosecutor General launched negligence charges 
against several North Ossetian officials. (15) 
 
I-R-O-N-Y 
Beginning on September 24, Moscow is hosting the World Congress of News 
Agencies. President Putin addressed issues of terrorism and media freedom in 
his speech to the Congress. "We have no right to forget the terrorists are 
cynically using the potentialities of media and democracy in general to multiply 
the psychological and information impact in the event of hostage taking and 
staging other terrorist acts in order to eliminate the freedom of the press and 
democracy. It is obvious that the struggle against terrorism must not become a 
reason for impairment of the freedom and independence of the press." (16) 
 
Putin’s statement is ironic considering the recent resignation of Raf Shakirov, 
editor of Izvestia, over coverage of the events in Beslan. Izvestia published an 
issue on September 4 featuring prominent pictures of the events in Beslan on the 
front page. Shakirov stated that his resignation was due to a dispute with 
Izvestia’s owner, Vladimir Potanin. However, an unidentified staff member 
claimed that the Kremlin requested Shakirov’s dismissal. (17) 
 
Shakirov is not the only journalist to have trouble because of Beslan. Several 
journalists were initially detained from reaching the site of the hostage situation. 
A reporter for Novaya gazeta, Anna Politkovskaya, was admitted to a hospital on 
September 1 after fainting on a Karat Airlines flight. Politkovskaya apparently 
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was poisoned as a means of keeping her from Beslan. Two other journalists, 
Andrei Babitsky and Jana Dlooglie, were prevented from boarding planes to 
Beslan. (18) Georgian journalist Nana Lezhava was drugged with 
benzodiazepines at the Vladikavkaz remand center. (19) Regardless of Putin’s 
speeches, media freedom does not reign unfettered in today’s Russia. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
The phrase "military reform" seemed to have left the vocabulary of Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov over the summer. After the Duma passed legislation 
making the General Staff clearly subordinate to the Defense Ministry, and 
following the departure of former Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Anatoli 
Kvashnin, Mr. Ivanov could be heard saying that reforms were finished and the 
time had come to focus on arms procurement. In the aftermath of the recent 
terrorist attacks on Russian soil, capped by the siege of the elementary school at 
Beslan, pundits and analysts were quick to highlight the need for real reform in 
the nation’s security apparatus. (1) Is it possible that these recent tragedies could 
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provide the defense minister with a unique opportunity actually to accomplish the 
reforms required to modernize and professionalize the Russian military? Several 
key ingredients seem to be in place: Fewer bureaucratic obstacles, a larger 
defense budget, and a clear and present threat. 
 
Ivanov, himself, reintroduced the idea of military reforms in a TV interview on 
September 12, less than 10 days after the tragic end to the Beslan crisis. He 
acknowledged the many shortfalls of the reforms initiated thus far, particularly the 
slow transition to a contract, professional force. He was also quick to point out 
that the defense ministry troops played only secondary roles in the government's 
response to the Beslan crisis, providing transportation, external cordon, and 
medical care. (2) However, future scenarios could be very different. In testimony 
to the Federation Council during their special session to appoint members to the 
commission that will probe into the Beslan crisis, Russian Chief of the General 
Staff, Gen.Yuri Baluyevsky, recommended legislation that would allow the use of 
defense ministry troops to resolve similar crises, suggesting that defense ministry 
forces play a much more central role. (3) The attitude reflected in this comment 
marks a departure from the General Staff’s attitude on this issue and adds 
urgency to real military reform. 
 
The Russian armed forces still rest on a foundation of conscripted soldiers. But 
two related phenomena are undermining that base which could destabilize the 
whole system. Due to changing national demographics, a large number of 
deferment categories, and corruption, the army has a smaller pool from which to 
draw its conscripts. Combined with the significant problems of draft dodging, 
desertion and suicide, the army is left with poorer quality soldiers, manning 
shortfalls, and the requirement to spend scarce resources in efforts to address 
the maladies listed. (4) 
 
Problems with the conscripts have also forced the Defense Ministry into a 
political quagmire: In an effort to increase the pool from which to select its 
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conscripts, the Defense Ministry is preparing a proposal for the Duma that 
recommends reducing the number of schools that have state accreditation, thus 
removing the deferment opportunity for a significant number of conscription-
eligible students. (5) Any discussion about cutting back deferments receives a 
very cool public reception. The suggestion of eliminating the student deferment 
has provoked a distinctly negative response from certain vocal segments of 
society. The most outspoken of these groups, the Union of Committees of 
Soldiers’ Mothers, announced on 17 September their initiative for a national 
referendum on the question of conscription. The proposed referendum would 
pose two questions: Should the government abolish conscription by 2008; and 
should current deferments stay in place until then? Although the attempt to hold a 
referendum is subject to a new law that confronts such an effort with major 
hurdles, the mothers' group enjoys popular support for its position, according to 
recent opinion polls. (6) Despite the Defense Ministry’s desire to improve the 
number and quality of the available conscripts, there is neither political nor 
popular support for an overhaul of deferments, and any attempts at change may 
carry significant political consequences. (7) 
 
It appears that the defense ministry has felt the political pressure. In an apparent 
attempt to diffuse the energy being generated by the referendum effort, Major-
General Nikolai Bezborodov, a member of the State Duma Defense Committee, 
issued a statement, highlighting the 2005 defense budget expenditure for 
contract servicemen. Gen Bezborodov claimed that R19.71 billion ($674.58 
million) was allocated for continued development of the contract force, funding 
levels which are "…more than twice as high as those of 2004." (8) The statement 
is simply a reiteration of the fact that the government intends to fund fully the 
four-year federal program concerning the professional force covering the period 
through 2007. Despite the upbeat tone of this release, designed to show the 
defense ministry was serious about the transition to a professional force, Sergei 
Ivanov had explained previously that "fully funded" meant that most new contract 
soldiers would be offered a paltry R6,000 ($205) per month. Low salaries, 
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combined with a severe housing shortage, suggest that the creation of a 
professional force is still in jeopardy. (9) 
 
Planned force reductions may also have a negative impact on the Armed forces. 
A report leaked from the Defense Ministry, (although likely with approval from 
higher up), stated that the Russian Army would have 100,000 fewer troops by 1 
January 2005. (10) This force reduction apparently has been in the works for 
nearly a year and is well coordinated through the defense ministry's departments 
and military districts. This comes as a surprise primarily because Sergei Ivanov 
has stated, as recently as 12 September, that there have been enough cuts in 
the force, and that the current 1.2 million troops constitutes the right number. (11) 
Although the reductions would come primarily from the ranks of club managers, 
construction workers and sportsmen, other specialties, such as drivers, 
mechanics and teachers, would suffer cuts as well. There is real concern that 
these cuts could reduce readiness of frontline units and have an impact on the 
future effectiveness of the military. Even when the cuts are enacted, it will be 
difficult to assess their impact on readiness, as many of the details will remain 
classified and therefore not verifiable by outside sources. 
 
This current cut comes without any clearly identified change in strategy or 
approach to combating potential threats. The potential is high that without an 
accompanying reduction in force structure (units, ships, aircraft), the manpower 
cuts will mean that forces in the field will degrade in terms of readiness. Baltic 
Fleet headquarters told Nezavisimaya gazeta that "with the current complement 
of 28,000 naval personnel, a further reduction of several thousand could see 
warships simply left to rust in their moorings." (12) 
 
Victor Ozerov, the Chairman of the Federation Council Committee for Defense 
and Security clearly articulates the two largest obstacles to rebuilding the 
Russian military into a force that can be responsive to threats: "I will not be 
revealing a great secret if I say that with any check on any articles of military 
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budget expenditure quite a long list of violations and nontargeted expenditure of 
monetary funds and sometimes even their direct embezzlement is brought to 
light." (13) According to Irina Khakamada, former deputy chairman of the Duma, 
unlike the defense budget of other modernized nations, with the Russian defense 
budget "…everything is classified — from salaries to the cost of chow. It follows 
that the Defense Ministry is controlling itself. This system generates corruption." 
(14) 
 
Mr. Ozerov highlighted another obstacle to effective military reform when he said, 
"I believe that without making specific assessment of the threats to national 
security, appropriate measures to neutralize them cannot be worked out." (15) 
Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin, a retired army general who now heads a group 
known as "Officers Are for Military Reform," asserts that no special study for 
reforming the Armed Force was carried out by the Defense Ministry. (16) 
 
If the Defense Ministry is to capitalize on the prevailing political environment and 
make the transition into a force that offers security, efficiency is key. Resources 
are scarce given the monstrous task of modernizing the Russian army behemoth. 
In order for any reform to succeed, the Defense Ministry must be accountable for 
the items to be acquired, and it must develop a comprehensive consensus on 
genuine threats, formulate a grand strategy and build a force that counters those 
threats. Until these tasks are done, the promise of reform will once again flail in a 
bureaucratic purgatory. 
 
Source Notes: 
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EXTERNAL 
Russia talks tough, but are they just empty threats? 
On 8 September, Chief of the General Staff, General Yuri Baluyevsky, was 
quoted as saying that "Russia is prepared, if necessary, to conduct preemptive 
strikes against terrorist bases anywhere in the world." (1) Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov confirmed the possibility of preemptive strikes against terrorist 
targets the next day. Both Ivanov and Baluyevsky have reiterated the threat 
several times since September 8th. 
 
President Putin set the tone in his meeting with western academicians and 
journalists on September 4. The tough talk benefits Russia in several ways: It 
helps to diminish the perception of Russian weakness, draws attention away 
from the security services’ performance at Beslan, and may place psychological 
pressure on the terrorists, who seem to move with impunity throughout the North 
Caucasus. Also, the putative preemptive strikes reassure the Russian populous 
that the military is pursuing an active role in the anti-terror war. Additionally, 
Moscow may hope to garner support from the American and British governments 
due to their engagement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The 
aggressive nature of the stance brings pressure on CIS countries to enhance 
their own counter terrorism efforts and assist Russia with its effort. 
 
President Putin made immediate political changes in the wake of the Beslan 
tragedy. He dealt a major blow to regional and legislative authority, but has not 
even pursued reforms in the security services. The Russian government's threats 
raise an important question: Without truly reforming the security services and 
having realized all putative preemptive strike threat-based benefits, is a military 
show of the force the next step in Russia's War on Terrorism? 
 
Military capability 
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Since 1986, the American military has used stand-off, low-risk, high precision 
guided munitions for both preemptive and reprisal strikes. While Russia and the 
United States now appear to share the same unilateral strategy of preemptive 
attacks for combating terrorism, they do not share the same military readiness for 
conducting these strikes. The United States invested billions of dollars into 
precision weapons and trained its military to use these weapons against time 
critical targets such as a terrorist meeting. 
 
Russia possesses some precision weapons, but they have not been widely used. 
Repeatedly Russian Military has displayed a distinct lack of precision, most 
recently in Chechnya, where Russia has chosen to level entire towns, rather than 
target single buildings. Additionally, the Russian command and control is focused 
on centralized control that limits the execution of long range strikes against time 
sensitive targets. 
 
Military experts, including Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, Vice President of the 
Academy of Geopolitical Problems, doubt that Russia could deliver effective 
preventive strikes against terrorist bases abroad. "Russia does not have any 
technical capability to destroy a terrorist gang that is stationed, let's say, a 
thousand kilometers away from its borders," Ivashov said. (2) "It is ridiculous to 
imagine that we would launch cruise missiles from a submarine or a ship to 
destroy some terrorist base, taking into account that it would be next to 
impossible to make the strike lethal and precise. We can strike an area, but not 
the command post. It is necessary to locate the command post or a gang in the 
field, rather than to deliver a strike into the area where they are presumably 
deployed," Colonel Ivashov said. (3) 
 
"When I talk of preventative strikes, that does not at all mean that we should use 
military combined units, front-line aviation, warships, and so on," Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov explained. (4) Instead of a cruise missile or long range 
 28 
aviation strike, the precise use of combat ready special forces from the North 
Caucasus military district would be the most likely show of force. 
 
Russia has shown the capability to airlift troops in force into an exercise hostile 
environment. The military exercise, Mobility-2004, conducted earlier this year, 
displayed Russia's prowess in airlifting more than 900 personnel and over one 
hundred combat vehicles from permanent readiness units in the western military 
districts to the Far East military district. With a severely limited and basically 
unproven strike capability, Russia would most likely use this type of military 
operation for any up-coming counterterrorism operation. 
 
Possible targets 
Though Russia has not stated officially any potential targets or whether it would 
launch attacks beyond the confines of the (nominal) Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the possible target list seems to start and end with Georgia. 
Georgia and its small Chechen population in the Pankisi Gorge, seem to 
constitute number one on Russia’s preemptive options list. The Pankisi Gorge 
has long been identified by Moscow, although not by other countries, as an 
allegedly safe haven for terrorists. Pankisi Gorge is located close enough to 
Russian airspace to execute the kind of quick special forces insertion that 
Russian could look to achieve. 
 
Georgia was not helped by comments from U.S. Ambassador Richard Miles. He 
surprised Georgian politicians and journalists with his remarks about the Pankisi 
Gorge, on September 13. Miles unexpectedly stated, "a few international 
terrorists" are still present near Georgia's northeastern mountainous Pankisi 
Gorge. (5) The U.S. State Department quickly issued a retraction saying that 
Pankisi Gorge "is no longer a haven for terrorists," and added that the U.S. will 
continue to cooperate with Georgia in combating terrorism in the region. (6) 
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Kodori Gorge, from which Georgian militia has engaged in clashes with Abkhaz 
elements, is another putative target for a preemptive strike. Georgian officials 
have reported several unauthorized overflights of both Kodori and Pankisi 
Gorges since 14 September. Russia has denied that any military aircraft have 
violated Georgian airspace. Moscow could be conducting reconnaissance in 
preparation for nighttime air and ground operations against either the Kodori or 
Pankisi Gorges. 
 
If European or U.S. diplomatic pressure proves too high for attacks on Georgian 
territory, Moscow could attempt to strike much further south, beyond the former 
Soviet republics. This would be much more difficult but also more impressive 
militarily and politically. Iraq would be an interesting choice. Russia could 
simultaneously show military strength and increase cooperation with the United 
States. The operation would have to be chosen with extreme caution, so as not 
to represent a reversal of Russian opposition to the U.S.-led Iraqi war. This 
mission is not likely for a number of reasons. It would rely on precision munitions, 
which is not Russia's strong suit. Also, Russia would need actionable U.S. 
military targeting of a Al-Qaeda position, which the U.S. would probably prefer to 
strike for itself. 
 
Russia could target an area in the Southern Caucasus or Central Asia. These 
areas are close to Russian airspace, which means they could support a special 
forces type operation, but there are more problems with this region. In the first 
place, there is not a single internationally recognized terrorist stronghold. 
Targeting a group of terrorists that has a loose connection, at best, to the attacks 
in Russia or might appear to be a weak response, politically, suggesting an 
inability to strike at real terrorist targets. Additionally, Russia might have to create 
at least the appearance of an effort to manufacture a CIS coalition before 
dropping troops onto another CIS country's territory. 
 
Conclusion 
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Russia has already gained whatever benefits it might derive from its threats and 
any possible military action is of high risk and quite problematic. Putin does not 
need a military strike to drum up national resolve or scare bordering countries. If 
Russia feels compelled to make some sort of military show of force, it is pressure 
that it is exerting on itself. Perhaps more importantly, Russia cannot risk any 
possible impression of failure. It needs to choose a target that fits its limited 
military proficiency and expertise. With significant risk and limited options, it 
appears unlikely that Russia will conduct an operation for little or no gain. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Has Yanukovich won? 
According to the recent election poll conducted by "Deminitsiativa" fond and 
"Sotsis" center, the gap between two main presidential candidates — Victor 
Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovich is 6% in the first and 7% in the second round 
of voting, with Yushchenko winning the polls. (1) The two independent 
organizations, which conducted the poll asked 2000 persons and stated that the 
margin of error was not more than 2.2%. The gap between the candidates is 
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rather substantial but certainly not big enough to stand in Yanukovich’s way to do 
his best to bridge it with both his pre-election tactics and machinations during the 
actual voting day. 
 
Presenting material inducements to Ukrainians is one way in which Yanukovich 
is planning to assure his victory. After years of not paying pensions and wages 
on time and leaving citizens at the brink of poverty, Yanukovich decided to 
double the minimum monthly pension from $27 to $54 per month, and to raise 
wages to state workers. His cabinet announced the decision on 18 September, 
less than a month and a half before the elections. (2) The intentions of such a 
decision are clear — to bring to Yanukovich’s side those remaining pensioners 
who might have been considering voting for Yushchenko. The question is: where 
did the money come from? The government has either switched on the money 
printing machine, which will undoubtedly mean inflation and price increases after 
the elections, and, consequently, the effective elimination of any wage and 
pension increases (leaving the population at the same poverty level as before), 
or the authorities have simply decide to use a "secret stash" of funds, widely 
believed to be reserved by the leadership for just such the occasion. Finance 
Minister Mykola Azarov stated, however, that the pension surge became possible 
"due to a surplus in the budget’s revenues from privatization." (3) If that is really 
the case, then the timing could not have been better for the authorities. Victor 
Yushchenko criticized this move as a matter of "stealing millions from us and 
then throwing a few crumbs from the table ahead of the elections." (4) 
 
Another, rather radical, attempt to bridge the gap between the two candidates 
was allegedly taken by the authorities. Victor Yushchenko allegedly was 
poisoned at the beginning of September. Even though Austrian doctors recently 
made a statement that they had no medical proof of poisoning, they admitted that 
Yushchenko had "chemical substances which are not normally contained in food 
products" in his system. (5) Austrian doctors diagnosed Yushchenko with acute 
pancreatis, which killed a deputy of "Our Ukraine," Oleg Aleksenko, in 2002. 
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Since the doctors have not interfered at an early stage of Yushchenko’s 
poisoning, the probability of the fatal outcome was as high as 80%. (6) 
Consequently, whoever poisoned Yushchenko, certainly did it if not with the 
intention to kill, then definitely with the intention to injure him enough so that he is 
either dropped out of the presidential race completely or at least for a substantial 
amount of time to considerably jeopardize his chances for winning this election. 
 
This attempt to stop Yushchenko’s political activity surely was not the first try. 
Ukrainskaya pravda describes a whole range of criminal activities that have been 
carried out against Yushchenko and his family in the past years. In 2000, liquid 
silver was given to Yushchenko’s newborn daughter, after which the baby 
stopped breathing and the doctors barely managed to bring her out of a coma. In 
2004, in Herson oblast’, a Kamaz truck attempted to push Yushchenko’s car into 
a ditch three times and when asked for explanations, the truck driver, from a 
nearby farm, quoted Article 63 of the Constitution, allowing him not to testify 
against himself. The recent spying on Yushchenko, according to the militia, was 
intended actually as "prevention of any crime against a presidential candidate." 
(7) For some reason, this very militia failed to prevent his poisoning. 
 
Yushchenko, of course, is not the only victim of the current government’s thirst 
for power and its efforts to silence critics of the current ruling group of oligarchs. 
Names such as Georgy Gongadze (the journalist murdered in 2000), nationalist 
leader Vyacheslav Chornovil (who died when his car hit a Kamaz truck in 1999), 
Vadym Hetman (Yushchenko’s predecessor as head of the National Bank of 
Ukraine, who was shot dead in 1998), serve to remind of the depths of ambition 
in certain government members. 
 
Outside pressure might force some change: Not the constant international 
requests for free and fair elections, to stop pressure on the media and allow the 
opposition to conduct their pre-election campaign free of interference from the 
authorities. No, the Ukrainian government does not seem to take these requests 
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seriously. The only lever that might work is frightening the authorities directly with 
deprivation of their personal privileges (e.g., refusal of visas to the U.S. and 
Europe, confiscation of property abroad, etc.) A bill of this nature was recently 
submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives by Congressman Dana 
Rohrbacher, but it is languishing. (8) 
 
Meanwhile, Yushchenko, with his face swollen and in visible pain after the 
poisoning, held two opposition rallies in Kiev and Zhitomir, attended by 
approximately 100,000 people. He gave an inspiring speech and assured all 
Ukrainians that they would win this election and that Ukraine would have a 
chance for a democratic and prosperous future. After the speech, he was 
surrounded by hundreds of people who wanted to shake hands with him and get 
his autograph. While there is at least some outside pressure and interest in the 
future of Ukraine, and while Yushchenko stands strong, Yanukovich has not 
won… yet. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Resignation of Moldovan presidential aid 
On September 17, Alexandru Petcov, a presidential adviser for foreign policy 
issues, was dismissed from his post by presidential decree. It is believed that 
from now on Petcov will be a part of the Communist Party’s central staff and will 
deal with the upcoming 2005 parliamentary elections. (9) 
 
Transdniestr region loses economically 
Transdniestr loses around $1 million per day due to the economic blockade 
imposed by Moldova — a substantial blow to an already impoverished area. 
Deliveries to EU countries have practically stopped, but CIS republics continue to 
buy products from Transdniestr. Transdniestr authorities are planning to reorient 
the majority of their exports to Russia in the near future. (10) The blockade was 
imposed by Moldova after the closure of Moldovan schools in Transdniestr, 
which refused to teach in Moldovan using Cyrillic script. 
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BELARUS 
Opposition funding 
Being well aware of the sources that finance the opposition, Lukashenko warned 
of serious consequences to any businessmen who sponsor or consider 
sponsoring opposition candidates. Lukashenko said that he was keeping an eye 
on some big businesses. According to him, the businessmen were sponsoring 
the opposition candidates for the whole purpose of getting their money back 
when the opposition comes to power. "It will not come to power and will not pay 
them back. No matter how much money is invested in Lukashenka’s downfall, 
this will never come to pass," said Lukashenko, strangely referring to himself, yet 
again, in the third person. (11) 
 
OCSE refuses to monitor the referendum 
The OSCE has refused to assess the referendum to approve Lukashenko’s stay 
in power by OSCE standards. The OSCE compared Lukashenko’s sudden 
announcement of the referendum to parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, 
where the elections were unexpectedly conducted through the electronic voting 
system. The OSCE has not monitored previous referenda in Belarus, nor did it 
monitor the 2000-01 presidential and parliamentary elections. (12) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 20 Sep 04 via (www.ukrpravda.com/cgi-
bin/print_ru.cgi). 
(2) RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 8, No. 179, Part II, 20 Sep 04. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) TV5 Kanal, 18 Sep 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Ukrainskaya Pravda website, 17 Sep 04 via (www.ukrpradva.com/cgi-
bin/print_ru.cgi). 
(6) Ibid. 
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(7) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 20 Sep 04 via (www.ukrpravda.com/cgi-
bin/print_ru.cgi). 
(8) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 18 Sep 04 via (www.ukrpravda.com/cgi-
bin/print_ru.cgi). 
(9) Infotag News Agency, 17 Sep 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) ITAR-TASS News Agency, 17 Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Belapan news agency, 18 Sep 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Charter-97 web site, 20 Sep 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
GEORGIA 
Russia on the prowl… 
Russia, post-Beslan, has gone on the hunt for culprits, and in its sights lies 
Georgia. While talk of preemptive strikes against suspected terrorist bases in 
third countries emerges from the Kremlin, Moscow is recirculating old complaints 
that terrorists roam the Pankisi Gorge. In response, Georgia is trying to 
accommodate Russia, while seeking assistance in the U.N., the CIS and its 
warm relationship with the U.S.. 
 
However, the U.S. is playing its cards ambiguously in siding with Tbilisi over 
Moscow, as indicated by a September 13 announcement by U.S. Ambassador 
Richard Miles that international terrorists remain in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. (1) 
Although the State Department tried to revise Miles’ statement by issuing briefs 
on 14 and 16 September that the Georgian counter-terrorism operations over the 
past two years had "shown a lot of success" in dealing with terrorism in the 
Gorge, (2) the damage was done. In order to demonstrate that the Pankisi Gorge 
represents no terrorism threat, Georgian Interior Ministry forces, in cooperation 
with the Security Ministry, carried out an "inspection" of the Pankisi Gorge. The 
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operation, which was supervised by both the Deputy Interior and the Deputy 
Security Ministers, involved a door-to-door check of identification documents of 
Chechen refugees living in the Gorge. (3) According to Georgian official 
estimates the number of Chechen refugees in this area has dwindled by nearly 
half over the last few years and now stands at about 2,650. (4) As expected, no 
evidence of terrorist operations was found in the Pankisi. As a further gesture of 
good faith to Moscow, the Interior Ministry and Security Ministry plan to establish 
brigades from the various law enforcement agencies, which will carry out 24 hour 
patrolling of the Pankisi. (5) In an attempt to prevent cross-border movement of 
illegal arms and persons, the Georgian Border Guard Department reported on 21 
September that Georgian and Russian border guard officials have intensified 
their cooperation and have agreed on close ties to exchange information. (6) 
Georgia is also offering the possibility of talks with South Ossetia, despite the 18 
September kidnapping of four Georgian peacekeepers. On 19 September, Nato 
Chikovani, the spokeswoman for the Georgian Foreign Ministry, stated that Tbilisi 
is ready to hold top-level talks with South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoev. (7) 
Both Kokoev and the Georgian Prime Minister previously had expressed 
readiness to meet each other, but Tbilisi insisted that the issue of South 
Ossetia’s political status be included in the talks. 
 
Despite these peaceful overtures, Moscow has turned its war of words into 
belligerent actions. This is demonstrated by the closure of Georgian 
transportation routes to Russia on 14 September, and Moscow’s pledge to 
prevent Georgian commercial airliners from using airspace until the airlines pay 
their $3.6 million debt. (8) According to the head of Georgia’s Northern Customs 
Department, Kakha Mikeladze, the loss of customs revenue from the Larsi 
checkpoint alone are between 3-4 million Lari. (9) Russia has denied that these 
moves constitute an economic blockade, but the detention of 60 Georgian 
citizens on 21 September at a Moscow airport for "visa irregularities" (10) 
indicates the Kremlin is not currently amenable to reconciliation with Tbilisi. 
 
 37 
On another front, the sparing match between Saakashvili and Putin at the CIS 
conference, held in Astana on 16 September, indicates that the CIS is not an 
appropriate venue for Georgia to establish a balanced relationship with Russia. 
The main topic under consideration was the restoration of the railway between 
Russia and Abkhazia, a measure Georgia views as inadmissible, and one which 
Putin claims was previously agreed with former Georgian President 
Shevardnadze. Putin argued that the CIS ban on contact with the Abkhaz 
secessionist government does not apply to the Moscow-Sokhumi railway 
situation since the rail linkage is operated by a private Russian company. (11) 
This is in stark contrast to the practice of international law which states that 
sanctions against a state or a territory are extended by the regime to all of its 
actors, governmental or commercial. Along similarly specious lines, Putin stated 
that Russia had the right to renew the railway line with Abkhazia because 50-60 
thousand displaced ethnic Georgians had returned to the Gali region since being 
driven from the area in the early 1990’s. (12) However, as Saakashvili pointed 
out, the majority of these displaced persons are treated as slaves, subject to 
kidnappings, random arrests, and beatings while their basic rights to education 
and property aren’t met. (13) Apparently, the notion of "returning in security and 
dignity" as favored by the U.N. has not penetrated the walls of the Kremlin. 
 
Despite Russia’s confrontational stance, Saakashvili stated, at a press 
conference on 20 September in New York, that Georgia will seek to 
accommodate Russia’s interests, adding that he has no intention of being 
confrontational with Russia. (14) 
 
In his 21 September speech at the U.N. General Assembly, Saakashvili tried to 
amend relations with Moscow by aligning Russian and Georgian interests in 
combating separatist conflicts in Chechnya, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He 
identified terrorism and its perpetrators, in particular Basaev, as the "common 
enemy" of Georgia and Russia. Saakashvili underscored the need for 
collaboration between Moscow’s and Tbilisi’s military efforts to fight terrorism in 
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Russia and the Russian Federation. Saakashvili also compared the separatist 
conflicts in Grozny with those in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi. (15) By means of this 
comparison, Saakashvili desired to include South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 
patchwork of rogue, terrorist states. In this way, Saakashvili hopes to cement 
international support for Georgia's current policy of reunification with Sokhumi 
and Tskhinvali. 
 
South Ossetian conflicts fuels opposition 
The unresolved conflict with South Ossetia fueled the creation of a new Georgian 
opposition bloc. On 15 September, Parliamentary deputies Koba Davitashvili and 
Zviad Dzidziguri informed journalists that their respective political parties, the 
Union for Georgia’s Unity and the Union of National Forces, will merge to create 
a new opposition party. (16) Davitashvili, who quit President Saakashvili’s 
National Movement in February to join the opposition, claims that the new right-
of-center party will oppose both the domestic and foreign policy of the present 
Tbilisi government. In particular, Davitashvili stated that the decisions to fire Chief 
of Staff of the Armed Forces, followed by Saakashvili's move to merge the 
Internal Troops with the Defense Ministry indicates a total lack of coordination 
between the various ministries in Tbilisi. (17) 
 
The recent consolidation of the two Union parties has provided a watershed for 
other oppositionists to attack the Saakashvili government. On 16 September, 
deputies from the New Rightists and the Republican Party criticized Georgian 
military tactics displayed during clashes in South Ossetia over the past three 
months. While New Rightists leader David Gamkrelidze labeled the military 
tactics as "impulsive, chaotic, and resulting in an absolute fiasco," Republican 
Ivliane Khaindrava accused the Georgian leadership of reacting irresponsibly to 
the crisis. (18) Labor Party Chairman Shalva Natelashvili displayed brighter 
nationalistic colors than his fellow opposition members in demanding an 
explanation at to why Georgia does not control South Ossetia. Natelashvili has 
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also challenged Saakashvili to a live televised debate and argues that 
Saakashvili has failed to deliver on many of his pre-election promises. (19) 
 
Although the Labor Party’s irredentist leanings are not echoed in the other 
opposition parties’ agendas, the South Ossetian conflict has united these factions 
around a common theme. This newfound oppositionist unity could either 
radicalize Saakashvili’s South Ossetian policy or destabilize the present Tbilisi 
government, unless, of course, Saakashvili is able to resolve the South Ossetian 
situation quickly and bloodlessly. 
 
CHECHNYA 
No answers, but lots of guesses 
Two weeks after the Beslan tragedy neither the Russian secret services, nor the 
terrorists, nor the hostages have a complete picture of what happened at Beslan. 
In the miasma of disinformation and accusations, Moscow at least has a familiar 
face on which to refocus international and domestic outrage: Shamil Basaev. 
 
On 20 September, Shamil Basaev ostensibly sent a letter to the Kavkaz-Center 
site, claiming responsibility for the Beslan terrorists act, and the blasts in the 
Russian jetliners and near the Rizhskaya subway station. (20) None too 
coincidentally, Basayev’s letter was posted just over a week after Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov informed Al-Jazeera that he "is certain" that the 
Beslan hostage taking was organized by Basaev. (21) 
 
In the letter purported from Basaev, he stated that 33 guerillas, including two 
women, participated in the school siege, and that the group was commanded by 
Colonel Orstkhoyev. In contrast to Basayev’s tally, the authorities claim that there 
were 32 terrorists and that all of them, save for Nur-Pasha Kulayev, were killed 
before they could be identified or questioned. (22) Former hostages and Secret 
Service agencies claim that there were actually between 40-50 terrorists. (23) To 
date, there exist no exact data on the number of hostages: In his report to Putin, 
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Prosecutor General Ustinov stated there were around 1,156 hostages. (24) 
However, teachers at the school claim the hostages numbered around 1,345. At 
present, 82 hostages are unaccounted for with doctors assuming that most of the 
missing are among the 73 bodies whose visual identification is impossible. (25) 
 
The fog around Beslan and its immediate aftermath indicates that either Moscow 
is still scrambling for answers or that the Kremlin is concealing information from 
the public. As proven by past Chechen terror attacks, such as Ahmed Kadyrov’s 
assassination, the Nord-Ost tragedy and the June Nazran raid, the facts will 
remain concealed until they are of no consequence. 
 
Save the children 
The Beslan tragedy revealed both the ineptitude of the Russian government to 
prevent or deal with terrorist attacks and the hopelessness of Moscow’s Chechen 
"normalization" policy. As such, the Kremlin has been the focus of much critique 
from military, political and grass-roots organizations. On 23 September, General 
Yevgeni Abreshin sent a letter to Izvestia in which he slammed Russia’s security 
structures for failing to prevent the Beslan hostage tragedy. (26) Meanwhile, 
European and Russian human rights groups gathered in Grozny on 22 
September for a conference to discuss ways to break the Chechen war deadlock. 
The conference’s goal was to find solutions "to escape the logic of violence and 
destruction for the good of…the Chechen population," Alvaro Gil-Robles, the 
Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner said at the opening of the 
conference. (27) The meeting, which was organized by the head of the Russian 
presidential human rights commission, Ella Pamfilova, and Vladimir Lukin, 
brought together human rights representatives as well as top Russian and 
Chechen governmental and security officials. Organizations attending the 
conference included Human Rights Watch, the Helsinki Group, and the Russian 
human rights organization Memorial, all of which regularly denounce rights 
violations committed by Russian and pro-Russian forces in Chechnya. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Kazakh election results 
One week ago, on Sunday 19 September, Kazakhstan held its second 
parliamentary elections since obtaining independence in 1991. During the spring 
and summer months, there were announcements and political machinations 
which seemed destined to affect the outcome of the polls. 
 
First, President Nursultan Nazarbaev announced in March that some of the 
voting would take place electronically. (1) Two of Kazakhstan’s three opposition 
groups, the Communist and Democratic People’s Choice Parties, responded by 
filing a (quickly dismissed) lawsuit with Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court, claiming 
that the possibility of "equal elections" would be damaged if electronic machines 
were used. (2) In late August, Asylbek Kozakhmetov, co-Chairman of the 
coordinating council between the two parties stated that the two groups might 
boycott the elections unless the number of regions to be polled electronically was 
significantly reduced. (3) 
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In July President Nazarbaev appointed Altynbek Sarsenbayev, a co-Chairman of 
Kazakhstan’s third opposition party Ak Zhol, to the position of Information 
Minister. Days later, Ak Zhol’s second co-Chairman, Bolat Abilov, was convicted 
of slander in what was viewed as a politically motivated case, and thus banned 
from participating in the elections. (4) 
 
Finally, President Nazarbaev’s oldest daughter, Dariga Nazarbaeva, leader of 
Kazakhstan’s newest party, Asar, began to speak out publicly on the eve of the 
elections, decrying corruption in her father’s Otan Party, and advocating the 
education of Kazakhstan’s electorate on its rights and duties. (5) In light of 
Nazarbaeva’s emergence as a political force, it seems possible that President 
Nazarbaev has suborned the opposition parties in order to clear a path for 
Nazarbaeva, presumably his preferred successor. (6) 
 
Kazakhstan’s elections were split between votes for Party lists and single 
member districts. Of the 77 seats in the Majlis, 10 were to be distributed based 
on lists, provided they passed the 7% hurdle, while the remaining 67 were 
directly elected by district. The Kazakh Central Election Commission on 23 
September announced the following returns: The Pro-Presidential Otan party 
obtained 60.6% of party-list votes, thereby winning seven of the ten distributed 
seats. In the single member district vote, Otan obtained 33 of the remaining 
seats. (7) Meanwhile, Asar, Nazarbaeva’s party, won 11.4% of the party-list vote 
(one seat), and two seats in direct votes. The second major pro-Presidential 
party, Aist, won nine seats through direct ballots, and one through party lists. (8) 
Kazakhstan’s opposition parties fared miserably in the polls. Ak Zhol obtained 
only one seat in the election, which was awarded on the basis of list-votes (12%), 
but did not win any seats in the direct-vote districts. Neither the Communist Party 
nor the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan passed the 7% threshold necessary to 
win seats. (9) Eight seats were won by independent candidates, while 22 will 
need runoff elections to determine a clear victor. (10) These results mean that 
Nazarbaeva is now head of the second largest pro-Presidential party in the 
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Kazakh parliamentary system, after the Aist bloc of the Agrarian and Civic 
parties, which achieved a total of ten seats, and is therefore well positioned for a 
succession when her father decides to leave office. But while the 19 September 
elections might be considered a success for a possible Nazarbaev dynasty, they 
were less successful in presenting a democratic image either at home or abroad. 
 
On Monday 20 September, Altynbek Sarsenbayev submitted his resignation to 
President Nazarbaev. Speaking to the press, he stated that he had resigned 
because the election "was not fair, trustworthy and free." He added that he could 
no longer remain a member of a government that "actively interfered with the 
election campaign, juggled and falsified results of the expression of people’s will." 
(11) Sarsenbayev was not the only member of Ak Zhol to speak out. Bolat Abilov, 
who is currently serving an 18 month suspended sentence for slander, stated 
that in his opinion, the party should properly have received 40-50% of the vote. 
(12) Ak Zhol has again filed suit with the Kazakh supreme court against the 
Central Election Commission for "flagrant violations of constitutional rights of 
citizens" during the electoral process. (13) Based on the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of Ak Zhol’s pre-election law-suit, it must be stated that the present 
complaint has little or no chance of success. At the same time, Sarsenbayev’s 
outburst should be viewed with some cynicism, since the question could easily 
be posed as to why he trusted President Nazarbaev’s promise of "open and 
honest" elections when he accepted his ministerial post in July. (14) One answer 
may be that Sarsenbayev accepted the post in order to draw attention to 
Kazakhstan’s democratic deficit and the plight of the opposition parties. 
 
Kazakhstan’s image abroad has not been helped by the elections either. The 
OSCE, which had over 300 observers from 33 countries present to monitor the 
elections, released its preliminary findings just a day after the elections. The 
organization found that the media had displayed "consistent bias" (15) in favor of 
pro-presidential parties. Moreover, the organization noted multiple instances of 
suspected voter intimidation, and irregularities with respect to electronic voting 
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machines, and that the CEC had exhibited a "lack of transparency" throughout 
the process. (16) Ihor Ostash, head of the OSCE mission noted that the elections 
"fell short of OSCE and Council of Europe standards for democratic elections." 
(17) The organization’s full report is to be released at the end of October. It is 
unlikely to provide much hope that Kazakhstan will make a transition to a full, 
transparent democracy once President Nazarbaev departs the scene. 
 
Kyrgyz elections 
Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections are due to take place in February next year. 
In preparation for the polls, a number of opposition parties in the country, 
including the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, the Democratic Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan, and the Republican Party of Kyrgyzstan decided on 24 September to 
create an electoral coalition. The new block, which is to be led by former Prime 
Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev has the aim of "ensuring free and fair elections" in 
the Republic. (18) 
 
In another important political development, a group of Members of Parliament 
asked Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Court to issue a ruling banning President 
Askar Akaev from running for a third term in 2005. (19) The Kyrgyz Constitution 
currently has a two-term limit on the Presidency. But another group of Members 
of Parliament believes that the new edition of the Constitution, approved in 
February 2003, allows for a third Presidential term. On 21 September, the Court 
struck a blow to the group opposing a third term, when it refused to make a ruling 
on the legality of a possible third term. The leader of the opposition in Parliament, 
Azimbek Beknazarov responded to the Court’s decision, stating that "now the 
acting power has the option of once more extending the authority of the acting 
head of state." (20) It is interesting that Kyrgyz opposition groups have brought 
the issue of a third term to the forefront a full year before Presidential elections 
are due to occur, especially since President Akaev has stated recently that he 
does not intend to stand for re-election in 2005. With some justification, the 
opposition does not take him at his word. There have already been calls from 
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several prominent business and financial groups (believed to be connected to the 
President’s family) for Akaev to extend his stay in office. (21) Moreover, an 
extension in office or a change in the Constitution would not be a new 
development in Central Asia. All three of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors have amended 
their constitutions, or held referenda allowing Presidents Nazarbaev, Rahmonov 
and Karimov to extent their terms further than permitted. There is no reason why 
Kyrgyzstan should prove any different. 
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